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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 19-2079 
__________ 
 
BRUCE A. KIBE, JR., 
                                 Appellant  
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Civil No. 2-18-cv-00228) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 November 1, 2019 
 
BEFORE:  HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed:  December 16, 2019) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Bruce Kibe, Jr., appeals from the decision of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to the Commissioner of Social Security who denied Kibe’s claim for 
disability benefits.  We review to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is 
supported by substantial evidence.1  We will affirm. 
 As the parties are familiar with the record, we raise here only those facts that are 
essential to our decision.  Kibe contends, first, that the ALJ erred at step three of the five-
step analysis by concluding that his impairments (learning disorder/borderline intellectual 
functioning, bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder) did not show the marked 
restrictions necessary to be “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing gainful 
activity”2 consistent with the impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 
12.05 (intellectual disorder).  Kibe points to his verbal comprehension IQ score of 70 and 
contends the ALJ erroneously relied on speculative inferences from the record to 
discredit it.  Kibe also complains that the ALJ ignored the fact that, while in school, he 
was placed in specialized classes for learning disabled students.  This placement, of itself, 
he says, was significant evidence of his impairment.    
Yet, the ALJ pointed to an array of evidence that undermined the IQ score as an 
accurate reflection of the severity of Kibe’s impairment.  Kibe did not produce any 
physician diagnoses of an intellectual disability.  Dr. David Newman diagnosed only 
                                              
1 Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).  “We have jurisdiction under 
both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review final determinations by the 
Commissioner.”  Id. 
2 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). 
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borderline intellectual functioning.  In addition, Kibe showed adaptive ability by:  tending 
to his own personal care; independently making and keeping his own medical 
appointments; showing an ability to read and write; and, exhibiting an ability to do 
gainful employment.  Moreover, after acknowledging that Kibe was in special education 
classes and had academic scores in a low to moderate range, the ALJ evaluated this 
evidence as insufficient to show low intellectual function.  In short, the ALJ did not 
ignore or misinterpret crucial evidence relevant to step three of the analysis, nor did the 
decision rely on mere speculation.  The ALJ’s decision that Kibe’s impairments did not 
show the marked restrictions necessary to meet a listed impairment is supported by 
substantial evidence.  There is no basis here to remand. 
 Kibe next contends that the ALJ did not include his borderline intellectual 
functioning, as well as marked limitations in a number of areas, in the questions to the 
vocational expert at step five of the analysis.  He maintains that this undermines the 
Residual Functional Capacity finding.  The ALJ erred, he argues, by disregarding 
evidence of limitations in social interactions, as exhibited in Kibe’s verbal and physical 
altercations with co-workers, and similar behavior with people outside of work.  He 
contends this demonstrates a marked limitation on his ability to work with others. 
Next Kibe says the ALJ brushed aside the opinion of his treating physician who 
opined that Kibe was completely disabled.  He maintains that Dr. Joel Last’s observations 
and conclusions carried great weight because he was his treating physician.  He also 
asserts that the ALJ relied instead on “stale” evidence.   
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There are a number of problems with his contentions.  The ALJ has wide latitude 
to create hypothetical questions that incorporate a claimaint’s functional limitations.  The 
ALJ also has ample discretion to weigh Kibe’s own opinions about his difficulties in 
work environments.  With that said, noting that Kibe had mental limitations and moderate 
difficulties in social functioning, the record shows that the ALJ constructed hypotheticals 
accounting for superficial or minimal contact with the general public and co-workers.  
The hypotheticals also addressed a need for simple, repetitive tasks and precluded work 
with a fast pace or with production quotas.  As for Dr. Last’s opinion, the ALJ did not 
disregard it.  He accepted Last’s diagnosis of a schizoaffective disorder.  But, as for his 
opinion on functional limitations and his general assessment that Kibe was completely 
disabled, the ALJ noted that the Doctor’s own record did not support his conclusions.  
The ALJ characterized Kibe’s medical treatment as conservative and largely successful in 
managing his impairments (for instance, dropping from monthly appointments to three-
month appointments to monitor his medication), contradicting Dr. Last’s conclusions 
about Kibe’s marked limitations.  This led the ALJ to give less weight to Last’s opinion, 
eliminating any concerns about the date of the evidence the ALJ relied upon.  The ALJ’s 
hypotheticals reflected the entire record; his analysis properly focused on assessing 
evidence of Kibe’s functional limitations.  We conclude that substantial evidence 
supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits.  
For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
